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Recent studies have suggested that relative to other types of marital disagreement, financial
disagreements are more problematic for couples. Using data from the National Survey of
Families and Households (N = 3,861 couples), we tested whether different types of marital
disagreements predicted self-reported marital conflict tactics. Considering the findings
overall, financial disagreements were among the consistent top predictors of conflict tactics –
including using heated arguments more frequently than calm discussion. Contrary to previous
studies, however, disagreements over housework also predicted conflict tactics about as
strongly as financial disagreements. Husbands’ reports of financial disagreements were more
closely associated with conflict tactics than wives’ reports.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial difficulties predict increases in depression, decreased marital satisfaction,
increased marital conflict, and higher likelihoods of divorce (Dew, 2008; Amato & Rogers,
1997; Conger et al., 1990; Gudmunson, Beutler, Israelsen, McCoy, Hill, 2007; Stanley,
Markman, & Whitton, 2002). Further, financial disagreements enjoy a level of notoriety
over other types. For example, financial matters are the most frequent topic of
disagreement between spouses (Chethik, 2006; Oggins, 2003) – though some assert that
this is more perception than actual reality (Papp, Cummings, & Goeke-Morey, 2009).
However, even Papp et al. – using a convenience sample of married couples – found that
compared with other topics of disagreement, financial disagreements tended to be lesseasily resolved, were more salient to couples, generated more heated responses, and lasted
longer than other types of marital disagreements.
Although financial disagreements relate to the frequency and length of conflict, few
studies have tested whether they are associated with conflict intensity or tactics. Further,
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only a few studies (e.g., Papp et al., 2009; Stanley et al., 2002) have compared financial
disagreements to other disagreements to test whether financial disagreements’ reputation
for difficulty is warranted, that is whether they are indeed more problematic for couples.
This study investigated whether the content of marital disagreements differentially
related to couples’ conflict tactics.
The particular focus was whether financial
disagreements were associated with more frequent use of calm discussion, heated
arguments, and violence than other types of marital disagreements, such as sex or spending
time together. We also assessed whether financial disagreements were more strongly
linked to a conflict style of having heated arguments equal or exceed calm discussion.
Researchers have found that heated arguments are most problematic when they are
accompanied by a lack of using positive or affirmational conflict techniques (Gottman,
1991, 1994). Thus, we also assessed whether financial disagreements were linked to a
conflict style of having more heated arguments than calm discussions. This study utilized
data drawn from the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH, N = 5,362 married
couples) to assess these research question. The NSFH is nationally representative,
longitudinal, surveyed both spouses in most couples, and includes detailed items on the
couples’ financial status, marital conflict tactics, and their marriage in general.
FINANCES AND CONFLICT
Marital Conflict Tactics
Nearly all spouses experience disagreements. The key determinant of relationship
health, however, is not how frequently spouses have disagreements, but the varying tactics
they use to resolve their differences (Gottman, 1994). Positive conflict tactics can facilitate
marital quality. For example, couples who use supportive gestures during disagreements
are less likely to experience marital distress (Gottman). Further, accepting a spouses’
solution during a disagreement can establish a benign process of trust and
interdependence (Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999). Further, couples can use
their disagreements to foster greater understanding and solidarity (Jenkins, Stanley, Bailey,
& Markman, 2002).
Researchers have also identified harmful conflict patterns. When spouses resolve
disagreements with high levels of heated arguments while neglecting positive tactics, they
can seriously damage their marriage (Gottman, 1991, 1994; Weiss & Heyman, 1997).
Conflict tactics characterized by anger and few positive behaviors predict decreased
marital satisfaction, increased marital distress, and an increased likelihood of divorce
(Gottman, 1994).
Marital violence is another destructive conflict strategy. Scholars have recognized
two forms of marital violence: common couple violence and intimate partner terrorism
(Johnson & Ferraro, 2000). Common couple violence is linked to situational conflict
resolution (Johnson & Ferraro; Roberts, 2006). In other words, it is a strategy that couples
use to get their way in a specific argument, although couples do not employ this tactic
frequently (Johnson & Ferraro; Roberts). This study only focused on common couple
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violence because it is the type that is identifiable in nationally-representative surveys
(Johnson & Ferraro).
Researchers have also linked the use of anger to resolve marital disagreements to
common couple violence. Sometimes, common couple violence can occur during heated
arguments (Roberts, 2006). Further, husbands’ and wives’ verbal aggression longitudinally
predicts their initiation of physical aggression (Schumacher & Leonard, 2005). Couple
violence may have its roots in a lack of anger management (Johnson, 2000) and the
frequent use of heated arguments may also share a similar cause (Gottman, 1994; Weiss &
Heyman, 1997).
Financial Disagreements and Negative Conflict
The main research question of this study was whether financial disagreements have
a stronger relationship to negative conflict tactics than other common marital
disagreements. One of the reasons financial disagreements may be related more strongly
to negative conflict tactics is that financial transactions and payment obligations are
frequent events. This gives couples frequent opportunities to disagree about something
that will impact their lives (Stanley & Einhorn, 2009). For example, bills arrive monthly – if
not weekly – and routine purchases, such as food and fuel, need to be made frequently.
Large unexpected expenses, such as car repairs, can also arise. Financial issues are
somewhat different than other marital issues in that they cannot easily be ignored (Papp et
al., 2009). That is, putting off a decision about a credit card bill to maintain marital
harmony has more problematic implications than putting off a decision about who makes
the bed or whether to attend holiday gatherings with in-laws – though ignoring routine
household chores like dishes and laundry could be disruptive (Barnett & Shen, 1997).
In addition to their frequency and unavoidability, financial issues may be related to
powerfully visceral emotions that might trigger negative conflict tactics. This is because
individuals connect extremely powerful meanings such as caring, security, success, and
esteem to money (Shapiro, 2007; Jenkins et al., 2002). When spouses attach different or
opposing meanings to money and its use, they may use negative conflict tactics to resolve
financial disagreements. These disagreements may have less to do with the actual financial
event and more to do with the underlying meanings of money (Jenkins et al.). For example,
one individual might want to purchase a luxury-class automobile because he or she deeply
feels that money should provide status and prestige. This desire might lead to problems if
their spouse wants to put the money into a retirement account because he or she deeply
feels that money should provide peace of mind. Recent research has shown that
“tightwads” often marry “spendthrifts;” unsurprisingly when spouses have these opposing
orientations, they are less satisfied in their marriage and fight more frequently (Rick, Small,
& Finkel, 2009). Although other topics that couples frequently argue about (e.g.
housework) may also have deep emotional ties (e.g., power), those involved in both
research and practice have asserted that “…money has symbolic potential unlike almost
anything else.” (Stanley & Einhorn, 2007, p. 294).
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Finally, studies have shown that money can have negative interpersonal effects. In
randomized experiments, participants receiving subconscious primers of money evidenced
less helping behavior and more autonomy seeking relative to the control group (Vohs,
Mead, & Goode, 2006). Further, survey research has shown that highly materialistic
individuals report poorer marriages (Dean, Carroll, & Yang, 2007). These studies suggested
that money brings about less affiliative orientations in individuals and have consequences
for interpersonal relationships. Consequently, financial disagreements may be more likely
to predict negative conflict responses than other types of disagreements. Thus, we
hypothesized that financial disagreements will be the strongest predictors of negative
conflict tactics.
Gender and Financial Issues
Financial disagreements may also be related to power and gender issues.
Disagreements over finances can, in reality, be disagreements about underlying power and
control issues (Jenkins et al., 2002; Shapiro, 2007). For example, when one spouse acts
unilaterally to assume debt or save money using jointly-held resources, this may provoke
conflict (Dew, 2007). The conflict may not necessarily be about the financial effects of the
decision, but rather about the power imbalance such actions reflect. Diary research using a
small number of married couples in Austria showed that most financial disputes concerned
impending or recent consumption decisions; decision-making power was an issue in these
disagreements (Kirchler, Rodler, Hölzl, Meier, 2001). Thus, financial issues can provoke
larger issues of relationship equity and power.
Historically, husbands have held the financial power within households. In
American colonies, few wives could own property or be employed for pay, though in some
locales women could continue running a deceased husband’s business (Kessler-Harris,
1980). And, although economic cooperation was the norm in rural areas during the mid19th century, urbanization and earning wages (or earning higher wages) gave husbands
more economic power in the late 19th and early-to-mid 20th century (Kessler-Harris;
Zelizer, 1994).
The legacy of husbands’ greater economic power continues. Despite increases in
wives’ paid labor force participation and economic contributions, husbands are still more
likely to be the primary financial decision maker than are wives. For example, in a study of
university faculty, 62% of married couples reported that they shared financial decisions,
26% reported that the husband was the primary financial decision maker, while only 12%
reported that wives were the primary decision maker (Bernasek & Bajtelsmit, 2002). The
majority of this group shared decision-making power, but husbands were twice as likely as
wives to be the primary financial decision maker. Wives may also be more sensitive to
becoming financially dependent on men as they marry or become mothers (Shapiro, 2007).
In 2006, most couples still divided finances within the home in ways that could
disadvantage women (Kenney). Thus, wives’ reports of financial disagreements may be
more strongly associated with conflict tactics than husbands’.
Alternatively, husbands might be more sensitive to financial disagreements. Because
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husbands have historically held greater economic decision-making power, they may expect
to continue wielding such power. That is, husbands may expect few if any financial
disagreements. Further, decision-making power may actually be a gendered resource that
is not governed by economic contribution (Tichenor, 1999). Consequently, husbands’
reports of financial disagreements may predict conflict tactics better than wives’ reports.
The Financial and Marital Context
By accounting for couples’ economic situations, we attempted to ensure that
financial conflict did not arise because of financial difficulties. For example, not having
enough money to meet financial obligations may elicit feelings of economic pressure. These
stressful feelings of economic pressure are positively associated with negative marital
interactions (Dew, 2007; Conger et al., 1990; Gudmunson et al., 2007).
The marital context may also be related to the conflict tactics that husbands and
wives employ. Marital satisfaction may increase the likelihood that couples will use
positive conflict tactics and decrease the likelihood of negative tactics. Spouses who are
happy in their marriages have a greater incentive to keep their disagreements positive.
Further, past interactions that have been positive may help them continue using positive
interactions (Wieselquist et al., 1999).
METHOD
Data and Sample
The sample for this project was drawn from individuals who participated in the first
and second waves of the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH). The NSFH is
a nationally representative, longitudinal survey of households. Wave 1 (W1) began in 1987
with over 13,000 households (Sweet, Bumpass, & Call, 1988). Wave 2 (W2) of the NSFH
was conducted between 1992 – 1994. Although the third wave of the NSFH was conducted
in 2001, some of the participants were purposefully and systematically dropped due to
budgetary constraints. Thus, we used the first and second waves of the data for this project.
The NSFH has many advantages for this study. First, the NSFH is one of the few
nationally-representative longitudinal data sets that includes measures of conflict tactics,
the different issues couples fight over, and actual measures of financial well-being, such as
assets and debt. Second, the NSFH collected data from both husbands and wives in most
households. This helps to eliminate single-reporter bias.
We used two subsamples of NSFH participants in this project. The first subsample
was a cross-sectional sample from W1. NSFH participants were included in this sample if
they were married at W1 and had a participating spouse. The second subsample was a
longitudinal subsample. To be included in the longitudinal sample, individuals had to be
married at W1, participate in W1 and W2, had their spouse participate in W1 and W2, and
not experience any separation or divorce between W1 and W2. The cross-sectional
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subsample had 5,362 couples. Of the 5,632 married couples in the cross-sectional sample,
898 were lost to the longitudinal sample due to attrition. A further 773 participated in W2,
but had divorced between W1 and W2. Consequently, the longitudinal sample had 3,861
couples. These two samples were not mutually exclusive; the couples in the longitudinal
sample were also in the cross-sectional sample.
Examining the characteristics of those who left the sample and those who divorced
showed the differences between the cross-sectional and longitudinal sample. Age and
race/ethnic minority status were positively associated with attrition in a logistic regression
analysis, whereas W1 levels of assets and consumer debt were negatively associated with it
(analysis not shown). Participants who were younger, who had lower marital satisfaction,
and who had been married more than once were more likely to divorce. Consequently,
attrition and divorce make the longitudinal sample less representative.
Measures
Dependent Variables. Three of the four dependent variables in the cross-sectional
analysis were items that asked participants about their conflict tactics. Participants were
asked how frequently they engaged in each of the following behaviors when they had a
disagreement with their spouse: “discuss your disagreements calmly,” “argue heatedly or
shout at each other,” and “end up hitting or throwing things at each other.” Participants
could respond that they 1 (Never) to 5 (Always) engaged in those behaviors.
We created the fourth dependent variable; it was a difference score. We subtracted
participants’ reports of using calm discussion from their reports of using heated
arguments. A positive difference score meant that participants reported using heated
arguments more than calm discussion. A negative difference score meant that they used
calm discussion more than heated arguments. We created this variable to address
Gottman’s (1991, 1994) contention that the use of heated conflict, relative to how
frequently positive tactics were used, was what matters most for relationship quality and
stability.
For the longitudinal subsample, the dependent variables were change scores (CS) in
the conflict tactics. To create the CS, W1 levels of calm discussion were subtracted from W2
calm discussion levels, W1 levels of heated arguments were subtracted from W2 levels, and
W1 levels of physical violence was subtracted from W2 levels. Further, we subtracted the
W1 difference score of calm and heated discussion from its W2 counterpart. A positive CS
meant that individuals reported an increase in the use of the particular conflict strategy. A
negative CS meant that they reported a decline.
Research has shown that spouses’ reports of marital conflicts are highly correlated
and can be combined to create couple-level reports of marital interactions (Gudmunson et
al., 2007). We used this strategy for the dependent variables. That is, we summed
husbands’ and wives’ reports of each dependent variable. This gave us the advantage of
being more likely to find reports of tactics that often go unreported (e.g., couple violence)
and also avoided the problem of single-reporter bias.
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Independent Variables. The main independent variables were five variables that
measured participants’ reports of how frequently they and their spouse disagreed on
different topics in the past year. These topics were “money,” “household tasks,” “spending
time together,” “sex,” and “in-laws.” The response set ranged from 1 (Never) in the past
year to 6 (Almost everyday). For the longitudinal analyses, W1 levels of each of these items
were subtracted from their W2 levels to generate CS.
Global marital satisfaction was also an independent variable. This item asked
participants, “Taking all things together, how would you describe your marriage.”
Respondents could answer that they were 1 (Very Unhappy) in their marriage to 7 (Very
Happy) in it. Marital satisfaction change scores were created by subtracting W1 marital
satisfaction from W2 marital satisfaction. We would have rather used a multi-item
relationship satisfaction scale, but no such scale existed in W1 of the NSFH. Despite this, we
were not worried about the use of this item since simulations have shown that single global
marital satisfaction item are psychometrically comparable to multi-item scales when the
sample size is large enough (Johnson, 1993).
Unlike the dependent variables, we entered individual wives’ and husbands’ reports
of disagreements and marital satisfaction into the models individually rather than
combining them. We did this so that we could assess the independent contribution of
wives’ and husbands’ reports of disagreements and satisfaction to the couple level reports
of marital conflict tactics. Entering these variables in separately (e.g., wives’ financial
disagreements, husbands’ financial disagreements) also allowed us to examine our
hypotheses about gender.
We used three variables to measure participants’ financial situations. The analyses
all included measures of total family income, total family assets (a sum of savings,
investments, and worth of the home), and total family consumer debt (a sum of credit card
debt, installment loans, and past-due bills). We surmised that including these variables
would remove much of the variance regarding financial difficulties from the dependent
variables. We transformed each of these financial variables using the log 10 transformation
to normalize their distributions.
Finally, we controlled for age, education, number of marriages, and race. Age was
the wives’ ages at W1 of the NSFH. Education measured how many years of education the
participant had completed. Number of marriages simply indicated how many marriages
each spouse had been in at W1 of the NSFH. To measure race, we used a categorical dummy
variable that indicated whether the wife was White, Non-Hispanic. The omitted category
was being a member of an ethnic/racial minority group. With the exception of age and race,
we entered these control variables in for both wives and husbands (e.g., wives’ education,
husbands’ education). We omitted husbands’ age and race/ethnicity because tolerance
statistics showed that they were too collinear with wives’ age and race/ethnicity to include
in the model.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. Couples reported that calm discussion was
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their most frequent conflict tactic, with heated arguments and violence less common. The
average difference between heated arguments and calm discussion was negative, indicating
the use of calm discussion more frequently. Both wives and husbands reported infrequent
disagreements. The means of the disagreements ranged from 1.48 (wives’ disagreements
on in-laws) to 2.05 (wives’ financial disagreements) on a scale of 1 – 6. Most were highly
satisfied in their marriage. Participants’ mean age was in the early 40’s, with most
participants in their first marriage.
Table 1 also shows that although reported frequencies of disagreements went up
between Waves 1 and 2, marital satisfaction was stable. Over time, couples utilized calm
discussion less, but hardly changed their use of heated arguments or violence. This
increased the number of couples whose heated arguments equaled or exceeded their calm
discussion.

ISSN: 1945-7774
DOI: 10.4148/jft.v2i1.1414
© 2011 Journal of Financial Therapy Association

30

The Journal of Financial Therapy

Volume 2, Issue 1 (2011)

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Wives

Husbands

M

SD

Range

M

SD

Range

Money

2.05

1.14

1–6

2.02

1.13

1–6

Housework

1.97

1.07

1–6

1.97

1.07

1–6

Spending Time Together

1.94

1.24

1–6

2.02

1.28

1–6

Sex

1.70

1.04

1–6

1.78

1.11

1–6

In-laws

1.48

.84

1–6

1.50

.85

1–6

Money

.09

1.12

-5 – 5

.06

1.12

-5 – 5

Housework

.11

1.14

-5 – 5

.06

1.14

-5 – 5

Spending Time Together

.06

1.40

-5 – 5

.03

1.43

-5 – 5

Sex

.08

1.18

-5 – 5

.07

1.29

-5 – 5

In-laws

.05

.98

-5 – 5

.06

1.00

-5 – 5

W1 Marital Satisfaction

6.06

1.27

1–7

6.13

1.19

1–7

Change in Marital Satisfaction

-.01

1.60

-6 – 6

.05

1.65

-6 – 6

W1 Age

41.52

15.31

16 – 97

44.21

15.76

17 – 90

W1 Education

12.55

2.73

0 – 20

12.60

3.22

0 – 20

Number of Marriages

1.25

.52

1–5

1.28

.57

1–5

W1 Frequency of Disagreements:

Change in Disagreement Freq.:

Couple Level Variables
M

SD

Range

Calm Discussion

6.69

1.64

2 – 10

Heated Arguments

4.13

1.59

2 – 10

Violence

2.27

.73

2–9

Heated Arg. - Calm Disc.

-2.55

2.73

-8 – 8

-1.44

2.53

-8 – 8

Heated Arguments

.05

1.40

-6 – 8

Violence

-.05

.71

-7 – 8

Heated Arg. - Calm Disc.

1.49

2.90

-10 – 15

$30,000

45,441.25

1 – 988,700

$55,628

124251.78

1 – 4,300,000

$96

3282.65

1 – 97,500

W1 Freq. of Conflict Tactics:

Change in Conflict Tactics:
Calm Discussion

W1 Incomea
W1 Assetsa
W1 Consumer

Debta

Sample Median
Note: The descriptive statistics for the change scores represent only those in the longitudinal sample.
a

ISSN: 1945-7774
DOI: 10.4148/jft.v2i1.1414
© 2011 Journal of Financial Therapy Association

31

Financial Disagreements and Marital Conflict Tactics
Analysis
We conducted the cross-sectional analyses with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regressions. That is, we regressed each conflict tactic (e.g., calm discussion or heated
arguments) on the argument topic variables, marital satisfaction, the financial variables,
and the demographic variables.
For the longitudinal analyses we utilized change score (CS) analysis in OLS
regression. That is, we regressed the CS of the different conflict tactics onto the change
scores of the independent variables. CS models are interpreted like other regression
models. That is, for every one-unit change an individual experienced in X (e.g., changes in
financial disagreement frequency), on average, they were predicted to experience a change
in Y (e.g., change in the conflict strategy) equal to the coefficient.
Unchanging variables (e.g., race) could not be directly included in change score
models (Allison, 1994; Johnson, 2005). However, unchanging variables can be interacted
with the CS of the other variables and thus included in the equation. We tested the CS
models both with and without interactions of the unchanging demographic variables (e.g.,
race, age, number of marriages). The findings were the same whether these interaction
terms were included in the regression or not. Further, the interaction terms were rarely
significant. Thus, we presented the CS models without the interaction terms of the
unchanging control variables.
We used CS models because they are a statistically sound strategy when measuring
change with only two panels of data (Johnson, 2005). Further, CS models automatically
control any variance related to omitted variables that did not change between W1 and W2;
they become the fixed effects estimator when only using two panels (Allison, 1994;
Johnson, 2005). This fact of CS models produces unbiased estimates of change and can help
control problems related to not including unmeasured variables in the regression.
The variables had between 0 and 9% of the responses missing. Instead of list-wise
deleting cases with missing data, we used multiple imputation to generate plausible values.
In multiple imputation, the statistical software (SAS, 9.1, PROC MI) used maximum
likelihood methods to generate 5 values for each missing response. The software then ran
the analyses, once for each data set, and synthesized the analyses to generate the final
results. Multiple imputation generates less-biased samples than mean imputation or listwise deletion (Rubin, 1987).
RESULTS
Cross-sectional Relationships
Table 2 shows the cross-sectional relationships between the frequency of different
argument topics and the frequency of couples’ different conflict tactics. Both husbands’ and
wives’ reports of financial disagreements were negatively associated with calm discussion.
Contrary to what we had hypothesized, though, housework disagreements were also
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negatively related to calm discussion at about the same magnitude as financial
disagreements. Disagreements over in-laws were also negatively related to calm
discussion.
The findings were about the same for heated arguments. The frequency of financial
disagreements was positively associated with the frequency of heated argument for both
wives and husbands (though the magnitude was stronger for husbands). But, wives’ and
husbands’ reports of housework disagreements were also positively associated with the
frequency of heated arguments and they had about the same magnitude as financial
disagreements.
Many types of disagreements were also associated with physical violence (Table 2).
The strongest was husbands’ reports of financial disagreements, but other types, including
housework, time, sex, and in-laws, predicted the frequency of using violence as a conflict
tactic. Wives reports’ of financial disagreements were not related to reports of physical
violence.
The final conflict tactic shown in Table 2 was the difference between couples’ use of
heated arguments and their use of calm discussion. Wives’ and husbands’ financial and
housework disagreements were positively associated with using more heated arguments
than calm discussions. For every one step increase in money or housework disagreements,
the difference between the use of heated arguments and calm discussion increased
between one-fifth and one-quarter of a point.
The standardized coefficients in Table 2 were somewhat small. This fact does not
nullify the importance of the findings, however. For example, a couple, in which the
husband reported disagreeing about the finances “about once a week,” would have heated
arguments about .40 (about one-quarter of a standard deviation) more often than a couple
that disagreed about the finances “less than once a month.” Further, that couple would
experience a .5 higher difference (about 1/3 of a standard deviation) between their calm
and heated arguments. Finally, the absolute value of the standardized coefficients for the
frequency of financial and housework disagreements were about the same as the
standardized coefficients for marital satisfaction.
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Table 2
Wave 1 Relationship between the Frequency of Argument Topics and Couples’ Argument Tactics
Calm Discussion
Heated Arguments
Physical Violence

Difference between Heated
Arguments/Calm Discussion

b

S.E.

b

S.E.

4.72***

.25

4.34***

.22

Money (W)

-.09***

.03

Money (H)

-.07**

.03

-.06

.13***

.02

-.05

.20***

.02

Housework (W)

-.07**

Housework (H)

-.10***

.03

-.05

.19***

.03

-.07

.16***

Spousal Time (W)

.01

Spousal Time (H)

-.01

.02

.01

.02

-.01

Sex (W)
Sex (H)

-.02

.03

-.03

.02

In-laws (W)

-.09**

In-laws (H)

-.06*

Marital Satisfaction (W)
Marital Satisfaction (H)

Intercept

β

β

b

S.E.

2.75***

.11

.09

.01

.01

.14

.05***

.01

.02

.13

.04***

.02

.11

.03*

.04*

.02

.03

.03***

.02

.02

.02

-.01

-.01

.01

.02

.01

-.02

.03

.02

.03

.03

-.05

.10***

.03

.05

.03

-.03

.06*

.02

.03

.11***

.05

.20

-.19***

.02

.01

.04

.12

-.14***

.02

β

b

S.E.

β

-.38

.38

.02

.22***

.04

.09

.08

.26***

.04

.11

.01

.06

.27***

.04

.10

.01

.04

.26***

.04

.10

.01

.05

.04

.03

.02

.01

-.03

.03

.03

.02

.01

.01

.01

.03

.04

.01

.03*

.01

.04

.07

.04

.03

.04**

.01

.05

.20***

.05

.06

.01

.01

.02

.12**

.04

.04

-.15

-.06***

.01

-.10

-.45***

.03

-.21

-.11

-.02*

.01

-.04

-.31***

.03

-.13

Freq. of Arguments:

Wife Age

-.01***

.001

-.08

-.01***

.002

-.02

-.01***

.001

-.06

.01

.01

.02

Wife Education

.03**

.01

.05

-.01

.01

-.01

-.01

.01

-.02

-.04*

.02

-.04

Husband Education

.03**

.01

.05

.01

.01

.02

-.01***

.004

-.05

-.01

.01

-.02

Number of Marriages (W)

.11*

.05

.03

-.04

.04

-.01

-.02

.02

-.02

-.15

.07

-.03

Number of Marriages (H)

.01

.01

.01

.03

.04

.01

.08***

.02

.06

.03

.06

.01

-.18**

.06

-.04

.19***

.05

.05

-.10***

.03

-.05

.38***

.09

.05

-.01

.01

-.01

.01

.02

.01

-.01

.01

-.01

-.01

.03

-.01

Logged Assets

.01

.01

.01

-.01

.01

-.01

-.007**

.003

-.04

-.01

.01

-.01

Logged Consumer Debt

-.01

.01

-.01

.02

.02

.02

-.01

.01

-.03

.02

.02

.01

White, Non-Hispanic

(W)a

Logged Income

F Value
R2

53.00***

129.41***

35.04***

118.62***

.17

.33

.12

.31

Note: Husbands’ age and race not included in the model because they were too collinear with wives’ values.
a Omitted category is wife not white, non-Hispanic.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Longitudinal Analyses
The cross-sectional findings were in line with expectations, but still leave doubts
about the association between disagreements and conflict tactics. Longitudinal analysis of
change presented stronger tests of whether financial disagreements were related to
changes in conflict resolution tactics. Table 3 shows the results.
First, increases in husbands’ reports of financial disagreements were the only type
of disagreement to predict declines in couples’ use of calm discussion, apart from increases
in husbands’ reports of disagreements over in-laws. Changes in marital satisfaction were
not associated with changes in using calm discussion.
Changes in financial and housework disagreements were positively associated with
increases in heated arguments for both husbands and wives. Although changes in wives’
spousal time and sex disagreements, and in husbands’ in-law disagreements were also
positively related, they were not as strong of predictors as changes in financial
disagreements.
Table 3 also shows that none of the changes in disagreement variables were
associated with changes in the use of physical violence. Indeed, the only variable that
predicted these changes was change in wives’ marital satisfaction. This finding suggests
that although disagreements were related to the use of physical violence in the crosssectional data, this association may be due to unobserved characteristics of the couple, and
not to a causal association between the disagreement types and couple violence.
Finally, changes in both wives’ and husbands’ reports of financial disagreements and
housework disagreements were positively associated with a change in the use of heated
arguments relative to the use of calm discussion. Husband’s financial disagreements were
strongly associated with this change. Interestingly, husbands’ reports of changes in
disagreements about in-laws were also positively associated.
To see whether we could rule out issues of reverse causality, we regressed changes
in financial arguments on the four types of changes in conflict styles (not shown). For both
husbands and wives, changes in calm arguments were not related to changes in the
frequency that couples had financial disagreements. However, change in heated arguments
and changes in the difference between heated arguments and calm discussion did predict
changes in the frequency of financial disagreements for both husbands and wives. Thus, we
cannot totally rule out a reverse-directional relationship from what we had hypothesized.
However, it does not make sense theoretically to assert that when couples’ argument
tactics become more intense, they begin arguing about money more frequently.
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Table 3
The Relationship between the Changes in Argument Topics and Changes in Couples’ Argument Tactics
Changes in Calm
Changes in Heated
Changes in Physical
Discussion

Arguments

Violence

Changes in Difference between Heated
Arguments/Calm Discussion

b

S.E.

β

b

S.E.

β

b

S.E.

β

B

S.E.

β

Money (W)

-.07

.05

-.03

.10***

.02

.08

.01

.01

.01

.16**

.06

.06

Money (H)

-.16**

.05

-.06

.11***

.02

.09

.02

.01

.03

.27***

.06

.09

Housework (W)

-.06

.05

-.02

.07***

.02

.06

.01

.01

.01

.13*

.05

.04

Housework (H)

-.06

.05

-.02

.11***

.02

.08

.01

.01

.02

.17**

.05

.06

Spousal Time (W)

-.01

.04

-.01

.07***

.02

.07

.01

.01

.01

.08

.04

.03

Spousal Time (H)

-.01

.04

-.01

.03

.02

.04

.01

.01

.03

.04

.05

.02

Sex (W)

.03

.05

.01

.04*

.02

.04

.01

.01

.01

.02

.05

.01

Sex (H)

.04

.05

.02

-.01

.02

-.01

.01

.01

.01

-.04

.05

-.02

In-laws (W)

-.03

.05

-.01

.03

.02

.02

.01

.01

.02

.06

.06

.02

In-laws (H)

-.14**

.05

-.05

.09**

.03

.06

.01

.01

.03

.22***

.06

.07

Changes in Marital Sat. (W)

-.01

.03

-.02

-.09***

.02

-.11

-.03**

.01

-.06

-.09*

.04

-.04

Changes in Marital Sat. (H)

-.03

.03

-.01

-.08***

.02

-.09

-.01

.01

-.03

-.05

.04

-.03

Changes in Income

-.01***

.001

-.15

.01

.01

.02

-.01

.01

-.03

.01***

.01

.14

Changes in Assets

-.03*

.01

-.04

-.01

.01

-.01

-.01

.01

-.01

.03*

.01

.04

.05

.03

.03

-.01

.01

-.01

.01

.01

.01

-.05

.03

-.03

Argument Changes:

Changes in Consumer Debt
F-Value

9.91***

34.12***

4.15***

20.17***

.04

.12

.02

.07

R2
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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DISCUSSION

Using a nationally representative sample of married couples, this study
demonstrates that what couples fight about, and how frequently they fight about it, is
associated with the negative conflict tactics they use. Specifically, financial disagreements
are one of the two strongest predictors of positive and negative conflict tactics – the other
is disagreements over housework. In the cross-sectional data, financial disagreements
negatively predict the use of calm discussion, and positively predict the use of heated
arguments, common couple violence, and the difference between heated arguments and
calm discussion. In the longitudinal data, increases in financial disagreements are
associated with increases in heated arguments, decreases in calm discussion, and an
increasing difference between heated arguments and calm discussion, but not with
increases in common couple violence. Consequently, financial disagreements may not only
occur more frequently and be more difficult to resolve as prior studies have suggested
(Chethik, 2006; Papp et al., 2009), but they may also provoke more problematic conflict
tactics than other types of disagreements.
This study contributes to the literature regarding the association between financial
issues and marriage. This study, like Papp et al. (2009), demonstrated that financial issues
positively predict negative conflict tactics. We built on and extended Papp et al.’s work by
testing the association between financial disagreements and marital conflict in a national
sample, by demonstrating that change in financial disagreements is associated with change
in conflict tactics, and by examining a broader range of conflict tactics. For example, we
show that financial disagreements are associated with the use of violence in the crosssectional data and with heated arguments exceeding calm discussion in both the crosssectional and longitudinal data. Unlike Papp et al., we pitted each disagreement type
against financial disagreements rather than aggregating the non-financial disagreements.
This analytic decision demonstrated that housework disagreements can be just as
problematic as financial disagreements.
Our study also adds to the literature by identifying gender differences. To be sure,
husbands’ and wives’ financial disagreements are equally predictive of conflict tactics in
three of the cross-sectional analyses. However, in the longitudinal analyses, husbands’
financial disagreements are either stronger than wives’ disagreements or are significant
when wives’ are not. These findings tentatively suggest that men may expect more control
regarding money (Tichenor, 1999). If husbands perceive increasing disagreements about
finances, they may use negative conflict tactics more frequently to enforce their desired
financial decisions. These gender differences also suggest that power issues may play a role
in why financial disagreements were the strongest predictors of conflict tactics. That
husbands’ reports of financial disagreements mattered more for conflict tactics indicate
that family finances are a gender issue (Dew, 2009), though few studies have used the lens
of gender to investigate money once it is in the family. These ideas are speculative,
however, and necessitate further empirical validation.
Unfortunately, the data are not detailed enough to determine why financial issues
are a stronger predictor of negative conflict tactics than other types disagreements. We do
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not know whether these findings reflect the continual nature of financial decision-making
or the differing psychological associations with which individuals imbue money. Perhaps
both of these processes make financial issues a more potent predictor of conflict tactics
than other issues. Future research might explore these ideas.
So far, we have reported the findings as if financial disagreements are the strongest
predictor of conflict tactics. In fact, in five of the eight analyses, disagreements over
housework are as strong of predictors of conflict tactics as financial disagreements.
Consequently, although financial disagreements are positively related to negative conflict
tactics, housework disagreements are also an important element in couples’ conflicts.
Like financial disagreements, many issues may underlie this finding. Some types of
housework (e.g., washing the laundry) are just as unavoidable as making financial decisions
(Barnett & Shen, 1997). Further, since wives’ entry into the labor force, housework has
become an even stronger center of gendered negotiation and contention (Hochschild &
Machung, 1989). Although we don’t know the reasons behind the association between
housework disagreements and negative conflict tactics, this is one of the first studies to
demonstrate this association.
Our study is not without limitations. For example, the findings may result from a
period effect. A national recession occurred in 1991. Because W2 of the NSFH was collected
shortly after the recession, this may have made financial issues and disagreements more
salient to couples. Consequently, although these findings may indeed generalize to couples
during recessionary periods, they may be less generalizable during prosperous times.
Attrition and divorce was also problematic. Older individuals and individuals of
race/ethnic minority were more likely to leave the sample. Younger individuals, those with
lower marital satisfaction, and those who had been previously married were more likely to
divorce. At the very least, this indicates that attrition and divorce made the longitudinal
sample less representative. Because those with the least happy marriages selected
themselves out of the longitudinal sample through divorce, we may not have a completely
accurate picture of how different argument types are related to conflict resolution tactics.
Another issue is the age of the data. Although the NSFH had advantages that made it
the only data set we could use for this particular study, it is an older data set. Marriage
relations may have changed since 1992. For example, as marriages have become more
egalitarian, financial decision-making may have continued to become more egalitarian. This
would mean that the association between financial disagreements and conflict tactics may
have decreased. An alternative scenario is that wives’ desire for egalitarian financial
decision-making might have grown, but husbands’ desire to control the finances may not
have decreased. Such a scenario would indicate greater potential for financial
disagreements to be positively associated with negative conflict tactics.
A final limitation we note is that the effect sizes are not as large as we expected. This
might also be a data issue. Small effect sizes frequently occur in studies of marital quality
using national data. Further, the longitudinal panels were separated by four to five years.
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Despite the small effect sizes, changes in financial disagreements were associated with
changes in conflict tactics, and the coefficient magnitudes were about equal to or exceeded
changes in marital satisfaction.
Implications for Practice
These findings are important with regards to the helping professions. Clinicians
frequently help couples experiencing financial problems, but they might not know it or
even ask about it. While discussing the field of marital therapy, Stanley and Einhorn (2007,
pg. 293) noted, “There are three subjects on the short list of those avoided in a ‘‘polite’’
society: sex, religion, and money. … Among these three taboo subjects, we think that there
is fair attention to one, some to the other, and almost none at all to the last one in our field.”
Although we would not dispute the idea that, “…process may be king,” (Stanley et al.,
2002, pg. 672) this study affirms that content should not just be dismissed (Stanley et al.).
Regarding the prediction of conflict tactics, financial disagreements were on par with
division of labor disagreements – a subject that is frequently addressed in therapeutic
training and practice. Thus, perhaps more care toward the financial content area is
warranted. Shapiro (2007) emphasizes this point by stating, “Therapists need to help
couples recognize the underlying emotions connected to money and help them grapple
with these affects. Then couples will be better able to use money as a tool to enhance their
life together” (p.290). As more information about finances and relationships is generated, a
clearer picture develops as to how practitioners should proceed in regards to couples’
financial issues.
First, practitioners could ask if finances have created problems in their relationship.
Just as important as addressing communication, division of labor, or a couple’s sex life
when working with couples, a practitioner might profitably explore financial issues. Asking
about finances is a multi-faceted endeavor which could involve a formal questionnaire or a
discussion about the matter. Alternatively, gathering information might involve a financial
genogram (Mumford & Weeks, 2003), assessing gender biases for each individual
(Zagorsky, 2003; Opiela, 2002), and understanding the power differential in the
relationship (Carter, 1988).
Depending on the practitioner’s financial literacy they may also want to assess the
couple’s basic financial status (income, outflow, debt load, etc.). If a practitioner is
uncomfortable delving into this aspect of the financial problem, having referral sources in
place to aid clients in practical matters of financial management is warranted. If the
practitioner feels comfortable and it is within their scope of expertise, they might use the
therapeutic environment to address basic financial education. At this time the practitioner
could address cognitive, emotional, and behavioral issues in regards to the couple’s
financial disagreements.
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CONCLUSION
This study is one of the first that shows that what married couples argue about is
associated with how they argue. Specifically, financial and housework disagreements are
more predictive of using positive and negative conflict tactics than most other common
problems. Like housework, family financial issues are associated with issues of gender and
family roles. Husbands’ reports of financial disagreements were sometimes stronger
predictors of conflict tactics than wives’ reports, and this pattern was reversed when
considering housework disagreements. These findings support continued research on the
association between financial issues and interpersonal relationships.
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